# **STANDARD**

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment KILL BOX FINAL COORDINATION DRAFT

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# KILL BOX

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR KILL BOX EMPLOYMENT

> FM xx-z.x MCRP x-xx NTTP 3-09.2.1 AFTTP(I) x-xx-x

# **MARCH 2005**

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MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

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# FOREWORD

This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other commands as appropriate.

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# PREFACE

# 2 1. Purpose

This publication presents a doctrinal framework/MTTP for planning kill box procedures across Service and/or functional components within a joint environment. A kill box is defined in JP 1-02 as: "A three-dimensional area reference that enables timely, effective coordination and control and facilitates rapid attacks." Although a definition exists, there is no formal kill box doctrine or TTP. This MTTP assists the Services and Joint Force Commanders (JFC) in developing, establishing, and executing kill box procedures to allow rapid target engagement. This kill box MTTP describes timely, effective multi-Service solutions to FSCMs, ACMs, and maneuver control measures with respect to kill box procedures.

# 10 **2.** Scope

This MTTP highlights kill box terminology, commonalities, presents known practices and includes key lessons learned. It discusses multi-Service kill box planning, responsibilities, coordination, and support. Specifically, this publication provides an overview of kill box procedures, methods of

14 employment, coordination/synchronization, and opening/closing procedures.

This MTTP is not authoritative in nature, however, it is consistent with joint doctrine, and provides guiding principles that can help planners coordinate, deconflict, synchronize, and execute/implement kill box procedures among the components assigned to a joint force. This publication covers planning and execution at the tactical and lower operational level. This publication will not be used by one or more Services, joint commands, other joint agencies, or other entities to obligate another Service in regards to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF).

# 21 3. Applicability

22 This publication provides the JFC, the JFC operational staff, and Service components unclassified 23 MTTP to implement kill box procedures within any area of operations (AOR). The target audience 24 includes commanders as well as the operations (current operations, fires, and future plans) and 25 intelligence sections of Service components and their main subordinate elements (i.e. corps, Marine 26 expeditionary force (MEF), numbered fleet, wing.), and their counterparts on the JFC's staff. This MTTP 27 can be used by the Services as a multi-Service training publication. This MTTP can be used by Services 28 conducting joint operations as part of a joint force, but each Service and JFC will ultimately decide the 29 range of applicability.

# 30 4. Implementation Plan

Army. Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the procedures contained herein into the US Army Doctrine and Training Literature Program as directed by the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Distribution is in accordance with applicable directives and the Initial Distribution Number (IDN) listed on the authentication page.

Marine Corps. The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication in US
 Marine Corps training and doctrine publications as directed by the Commanding General, US Marine
 Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). Distribution is in accordance with the Marine Corps
 Publication Distribution System (MCPDS).

Navy. The Navy will incorporate these procedures in US Navy training and doctrine publications as
 directed by the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)[I5]. Distribution is in

accordance with Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedure Desk Guide (MILSTRIP Desk Guide)
 Navy Supplement Publication-409 (NAVSUP P-409) and NTTP 1-01, The Navy Warfare Library.

Air Force. The Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication in accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-360.

# 5 **5. User Information**

a. TRADOC; MCCDC; NWDC; Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center (HQ AFDC); and the Air
Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication with the joint participation of the
approving Service commands. ALSA will review and update this publication as necessary.

9 b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control (C2)

organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in Service protocol,
 appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, will likewise be incorporated in revisions to this

12 document.

13 c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your comments to the

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KILL BUX

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March 2005

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# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

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**KILL BOX** 2 Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and 3 **Procedures for Kill Box Employment** 4 **Overview** 5 6 Commanders and staffs must understand the elements and use of kill boxes in order to plan, develop, 7 and employ them effectively in support of the joint force commander's requirements. This publication 8 offers a detailed explanation of kill box process and provides information to effectively organize, plan, 9 and execute kill box procedures in a combined and joint environment. This document: 10 Combines lessons learned and best practices from Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, • IRAQI FREEDOM and recent exercises. 11 12 Provides basic background information on kill boxes. 13 Outlines factors impacting the planning of kill boxes. • 14 Describes procedures and factors impacting the execution of kill boxes. • 15 Provides examples and scenarios involving kill box establishment and operations to better • 16 illustrate the concepts and employment of kill boxes. **Overview of Kill Box Concept** 17 18 Chapter I defines what a kill box is, and briefly describes the purpose, employment of, and overarching considerations concerning kill boxes. It provides a graphic portrayal of the concepts and 19 20 defines unique kill box terms used in the document. 21 Kill Box Planning and Development Considerations 22 Chapter II provides an overview of the various planning and coordinating considerations. It also 23 describes the process of establishing kill boxes and describes the characteristics of the two different types 24 of kill boxes. The blue kill box which permits air-to-surface fires, and the purple kill box which permits integration of surface-to-surface fires with air-to-surface. 25 26 Note: Some terms used in this MTTP not in accordance with published joint doctrine. However, the 27 described terms are consistent with the intent of existing joint doctrine. **Kill Box Execution** 28 Chapter III describes factors and procedures (such as coordination) involved in conducting kill box 29 30 operations. **Appendices** 31

1 2	The app include:	bendices provide additional detailed information relevant to kill box operations. These
3	•	Kill Box Request Matrix.
4	•	Component Kill Box Coordination Examples.
5	•	JFSOCC C2 for Kill Box Operations
6	•	Theater-Specific Kill Box Procedures.
7 8	•	Common Geographic Reference System (CGRS) description, set-up procedures, implementation, and uses.

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29	Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, AL
30	HQ USAF/JAO, Operations Law Division, Washington DC
31	9 <sup>th</sup> Air Force CPS, Shaw AFB, SC
32	9 <sup>th</sup> Air Force COS, Shaw AFB, SC
33	HQ Air Combat Command/DOYA, Langley AFB, VA
34	HQ Air Combat Command/DOTW, Langley AFB, VA
35	HQ Air Combat Command/DR-UAV SMO, Langley AFB, VA
36	HQ Pacific Air Forces/DOTW, Hickam AFB, HI
37	HQ Air Warfare Center/DO, Nellis AFB, NV
38	98 <sup>th</sup> Range Wing, Nellis AFB, NV
39	93 <sup>rd</sup> Bomb Squadron, Barksdale AFB, LA

- 1 16<sup>th</sup> Operation Support Squadron/OSKW, Robins AFB, GA
- 2 AFRL, Wright Patterson AFB, OH
- 3 AFC2ISRC, Langley AFB, VA
- 4 Air Ground Operations School, Nellis AFB, NV
- 5 Detachment 2, 605th Test Squadron, Melbourne, FL
- 6 505<sup>th</sup> Command and Control Wing, Hurlburt Field, FL
- 7 Eighth Air Force/608<sup>th</sup> Combat Operation Squadron, Barksdale AFB, LA

1	Chapter I
2	OVERVIEW OF KILL BOX CONCEPT

# 3 **1. Definition and Purpose**

a. Definition: A kill box is a three-dimensional fire support coordinating measure (FSCM) used
to facilitate the expeditious air-to-surface lethal attack of targets, which may be augmented by or
integrated with surface-to-surface fires.

b. Purpose: When established, the primary purpose of a kill box is to allow air assets to conduct
interdiction against surface targets without further coordination with the establishing commander and
without terminal attack control. A kill box will not be established specifically for close air support
(CAS) missions. However, this does not restrict CAS missions inside of established kill boxes if all
CAS requirements are met. When used to integrate air-to-surface and surface-to-surface fires, the kill
box will have appropriate restrictions.

13

# 14 **2. Establishment**

15 A kill box is established and adjusted by the appropriate supported commander and is an extension of an existing support relationship established by the Joint Force Commander (JFC). Kill 16 17 box boundaries normally are defined using an area reference system (e.g., common geographic reference system [CGRS], Appendix E), but could follow well defined terrain features or may be 18 19 located by grid coordinates or by a radius from a center point. Changes to a kill box require 20 notification of all affected forces within the joint operations area (JOA) and must allow sufficient time for these forces and/or components to incorporate the kill box change. Types of kill boxes are 21 22 discussed below:

a. Blue Kill Box. A blue kill box permits air-to-surface fires effects in the kill box without
 further coordination or deconfliction.

b. Purple Kill Box. A purple kill box permits the integration of surface-to-surface fires with
 air-to-surface fires into the purple kill box without further coordination

27 c. Kill Box Terminology.

(1) Established. A kill box that is in effect. Information about the time it becomes
established, the duration, or other attributes will be published and disseminated using existing voice
and digital command and control (C2) systems such as: Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data
System (AFATDS), theater battle management core system (TBMCS), or fragmentary order
(FRAGO) from the establishing headquarters.

33

(a) **Open.** Term used to describe a portion or portions of a kill box that is open to fires.


(b) Closed. Term used to describe a portion or portions of an established kill box in
 which fires or effects of fires are not allowed without further coordination

36 (c) Active. An established kill box that has aircraft flying in the space defined by the
 37 box or effects of air or other joint fires within the boundaries of the kill box.

38 (d) Cold. An established kill box that is not active. All portions of the kill box are
 39 open to fires unless identified as closed.

1 (2) **Cancelled.** The kill box is no longer in effect.

2 (3) **Area Reference System.** An area reference system is primarily an operational-level 3 administrative measure used to coordinate geographical areas rapidly for battlespace deconfliction 4 and synchronization. This reference system provides a common language between the components 5 and simplifies communications. (CGRS, Appendix E and JP 3-60, Appendix D)



<sup>6</sup> 

Figure I-1. Life Cycle of a Kill Box

d. Kill Box Deconfliction and Coordination. The first forward air controller (airborne)
[FAC(A)], strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR), rescue mission coordinator (RMC),
mission commander, or flight lead on station is responsible for deconfliction and coordination if
required.

e. **Linear Battlespace.** Kill boxes can augment use of traditional FSCMs, such as fire support coordination line (FSCL), coordinated fire line (CFL), and battlefield coordination line (BCL). They can help the commander focus the effort of air and indirect fire assets.

14 f. **Non-linear Battlespace.** When traditional FSCMs are not useful or are less applicable, the 15 kill box can be another method for identifying areas to focus air and indirect fire assets.

16

# 17 3. Employment

18 Kill boxes are normally used when a support relationship already exists between two or more 19 functional or service components. The goal is to reduce the coordination required to fulfill support 20 requirements with maximum flexibility, while preventing fratricide.

1 a. Kill boxes support the commander's objectives and desired effects. As such all target

engagements within them should adhere to the supported commander's established priorities, desiredeffects, and timing of fires.

- 4 b. Use of kill boxes is not mandatory.
- 5 c. Command and control updates on kill boxes will be accomplished (e.g., altitude restrictions,
- 6 frequency use, established control measures within the kill box) via appropriate C2 systems. With
- 7 appropriate restrictions, surface-to-surface fires may occur simultaneously with air-to-surface strikes.




Figure I-2. Kill Box Battlespace




Figure I-3. Kill Box Locations

# 2 4. Considerations

a. It is important to note that a kill box is an FSCM and is **not** a reference system. Kill box
boundaries are normally defined using an area reference system which provides the construct (a twodimensional system) and a kill box (a three-dimensional system) is the application.

b. Applicable rules of engagement (ROE), collateral damage (CD) guidance and restrictions,
positive identification (PID), and the special instructions (SPINS) must still be followed in a kill box.

c. The decision to use a kill box requires careful consideration by the JFC or the supported
commander. If used, its size, location, and timing are based on estimates of the situation and concept
of operations. Disposition of enemy forces, friendly forces, anticipated rates of movement, concept
and tempo of the operation, surface-to-surface weapon capabilities, and other factors must be
considered by the commander.

d. A kill box is a unique FSCM that may contain other measures within its boundaries [e.g., nofire areas (NFAs), restricted operating zones (ROZs), airspace coordination areas (ACAs), etc.].

e. Integration of air-to-surface and surface-to-surface fires requires application of appropriate
restrictions: altitude, time separation, or lateral separation. The supported commander will determine
which of these is appropriate for the mission and ensure dissemination through the appropriate C2
nodes.

- 19
- 20
- 21 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

# 1 **5. Graphic Portrayal**


6

2 The kill box may be graphically portrayed as an area outlined with a solid bold blue or purple line

3 (signifying the type of kill box) with corresponding colored diagonal lines inside (figure I-4. The

4 letters "BKB – Blue kill box" or "PKB – Purple kill box" are within, followed by the establishing

5 headquarters and the effective date time group (DTG).



# Chapter II

# 2 KILL BOX PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS

# 3 1. General

4 a. The JFC establishes detailed procedures and concept of operations for successful kill box

5 employment within the JOA by promulgating guidance and priorities. Additionally, the JFC

6 designates the establishing authority for kill boxes (usually, the component commander).

Component commanders may delegate authority for establishing kill boxes. The establishingauthority is responsible for coordinating with and notifying all affected forces.

9 b. An area reference system facilitates the structural and procedural requirements for using kill
10 boxes but is not an absolute requirement.

c. Kill box procedures will not be ideal for every situation. Considerations of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available/civil considerations (METT-T/C) and requirements for terminal attack control may determine that other procedures would be more effective.

15

1

# 16 2. Planning Considerations

a. Establishing a kill box requires careful planning and coordination. This section outlines someof the considerations for successful planning.

b. Kill boxes can be applied to different portions of the battlespace, including rear areas, to
facilitate expeditious target engagement. Also, the kill box is an applicable tool where traditional
coordination measures (e.g., FSCL) do not exist or have not been established.

c. The component commanders must be able to communicate kill box status in a timely manner.
This will ensure systems and organization databases are updated. The architecture and means by
which this information is disseminated should be identified early in the planning process. It must
accommodate planned and immediate kill boxes. Communications methods may include joint and
multinational digital and voice systems. Units responsible for input of kill box status must be
identified; as well as, primary and secondary systems over which the information will be passed to
ensure timely dissemination of kill box status.

29 d. Planning Considerations.

- 30 (1) Commander's guidance and intent.
- 31 (2) Targeting priorities.
- 32 (3) Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB).
- 33 (4) Location of other FSCMs and airspace control measures (ACMs).

(5) Concept of operations and scheme of maneuver (kill boxes should not impede or
 adversely impact the scheme of maneuver). Kill boxes are intended to optimize available air assets
 in conjunction with the commander's concept of operation.

37 (6) Friendly locations and capabilities including special operations and other government38 agencies.

- (a) Kill boxes should be clear of all friendly forces. In cases when this is not possible,
   appropriate restrictive measures must be established.
  - (b) Consider the impact on surface-to-surface fires ranges and trajectories.
- 4 (c) Surface-to-air fires responsiveness could be reduced due to additional coordination 5 requirements.
- 6 7

3

(d) Weapons release may occur outside the confines of the kill box where effects are intended.

8 (7) Communication. What frequencies to use must be considered in the development of the 9 communications plan. Ideally there will be a frequency associated with a specific kill box. This will 10 enable the assets entering the kill box to have a common frequency for coordination. As the number 11 of kill boxes established increases the available number of frequencies decreases and reduces 12 flexibility.

(8) ROE. The nature of target engagement within a kill box may not be the same as for other
 areas of the battlespace. Planners at the joint and component level must determine if the current ROE
 is appropriate or unduly restricts kill box operations and request appropriate ROE adjustments as
 required.

(9) Restrictions. Planners developing kill boxes must be aware that there are many
constraints and restrictions that may impact how operations are executed within the kill box. Such
restrictions could include requirements regarding collateral damage, positive identification, restricted
target list (RTL), no-strike list (NSL), and SPINS.

21

# 22 **3. Kill Box Development**

a. Kill boxes are tools for coordinating fires, but they are not the only tools. Commanders retain
 their full range of FSCMs and ACMs at their disposal to manage the battlespace.

25 (1) **Planned Kill Box.** A planned kill box is developed during the planning process, and/or the joint targeting cycle by a supported commander. Fire support planners must ensure dissemination 26 27 of all planned FSCMs including kill box attributes, are included in the airspace control order (ACO) 28 or SPINS. Widest dissemination of the plan will enable greater understanding of the scheme of 29 maneuver. A kill box can be planned in a targeted area of interest (TAI) where a commander might 30 expect the requirement for a specified time period. Air assets should be assigned to planned kill 31 boxes in the ATO. TBMCS does not allow tasking air assets to FSCMs or multiple airspaces. Assets 32 will be directed to a specific point or air space (e.g. target or ROZ). Specific instructions for planned 33 kill boxes will be disseminated via individual mission amplification (MSN APMN) field in the ATO 34 or in the SPINS. Procedures for each theatre may vary.

(2) Immediate Kill Box. An immediate kill box is developed during the execution of an
operation. If the supported commander needs to establish a kill box that cannot be promulgated
through planning documents he/she calls their liaison element such as a battlefield coordination
detachment (BCD) or goes through the direct air support center (DASC)/air support operations center
(ASOC) to inform the joint air operations center (JAOC) that an FSCM was created and the time it
will be active. C2 systems must be updated to reflect the new FSCM.

b. While kill boxes are permissive FSCMs with respect to the deliverance of air-to-surface
weapons they are also restrictive in nature. Trajectories and effects of surface-to-surface fires are not
normally allowed to pass through the kill box. Also air-to-surface munitions (and their trajectories)
delivered by aircraft not assigned to the kill box are not permitted to pass through the kill box unless

coordinated. All aircraft not assigned to operate within a kill box are restricted from flying through a
 kill box without permission of the designated controlling authority.

c. Restrictive FSCMs and ACMs will always have priority when established in a kill box. For
example, aircraft cannot drop on an established NFA and must abide by the confines of an ACA.
However, a kill box may take priority over permissive FSCMs. For example, a FSCL that crosses an
established kill box does not close that kill box.

d. Engagement authority is automatically granted by the establishment of a kill box but does not
relieve the aircrew of the responsibility for complying with requirements such as commander's
designated target priority, PID, CD, ROE, and SPINS.

10

# 11 4. Blue Kill Box

a. A blue kill box permits air-to-surface fires effects in the kill box without further coordination or deconfliction (See Figure II-1). If the kill box is active, air-to-surface munitions (and their trajectories) delivered by aircraft not assigned to the blue kill box need to be coordinated. All aircraft not assigned to an active blue kill box are restricted from flying through it unless coordinated with the kill box coordinator (KBC). The airspace included by a blue kill box extends from the surface up to the limit established by the ACA.


Note: Ordnance may be delivered outside the airspace defined by the kill box to include stand-off
 surface-to-surface and air-to-surface weapons (See Figures II-1 and II-2).

20 b. A blue kill box minimizes the restrictions on air-to-surface fires, while also protecting

21 aircraft. Effects and trajectories of surface-to-surface fires are not allowed to pass through the blue

22 kill box. Land and naval force commanders must coordinate with the air component to deliver

23 surface-to-surface fires into or through an established blue kill box.



2

Figure II-1. Notional Blue Kill Box

# 3 5. Purple Kill Box

4 a. **Permits Integration of Fires.** A purple kill box permits the integration of surface-to-surface 5 fires with air-to-surface fires into the purple kill box without further coordination (Figure II-2). Air-6 to-surface and surface-to-surface fires can be deconflicted by altitude, lateral, or time separation. The 7 establishing headquarters will coordinate with the air component to define the appropriate 8 deconfliction technique for operations within the purple kill box. All aircraft not assigned to an active 9 purple kill box are restricted from flying through it unless coordinated. Also air-to-surface munitions 10 (and their trajectories) delivered by aircraft not assigned to the kill box will not violate the purple kill 11 box unless coordinated. Ground units are required to obtain clearance from the air component for any 12 surface-to-surface fires whose trajectories will violate the altitude, lateral, or time restrictions. 13

b. Primary Purpose. The primary purpose of a purple kill box is to reduce the coordination
 requirements for air-to-surface fires, while still allowing ground commanders to employ surface-to surface fires. The purple kill box allows the maximum use of joint fires in the kill box creating a
 synergistic effect and maximum potential for engaging targets.

17 c. Deconfliction Techniques

(1) Lateral Separation. Lateral separation is effective for coordinating fires against targets
 that are adequately separated from flight routes to ensure aircraft protection from the effects of
 friendly fires.

(2) Altitude Separation. Altitude separation is effective for coordinating fires when aircrews
 will remain above or below indirect fire trajectories and their effects.

1 (3) Altitude and Lateral Separation. Altitude and lateral separation is the most restrictive 2 technique for aircrews and may be required when aircraft must cross the firing unit's gun-target 3 line.

4 (4) **Time Separation.** Time separation requires the most detailed coordination and may be 5 required when altitude restrictions from indirect fire trajectories (e.g. mortar trajectory) adversely 6 impact aircraft ordnance delivery.




Figure II-2. Notional Purple Kill Box

# **6. Kill Box Responsibilities Matrix**

2 The following matrix (See Table II-1) describes the responsibilities inherent in employment of 3 the types of kill boxes. This is a generic table that assumes that components are the establishing 4 authority within a joint force.

Kill Box Responsibilities Matrix					
Type / Attributes	Establishing Authority (EA) <sup>1</sup>	Coordination Requirement	Critical Nodes	Mission	Other
BLUE KILL BOX - Outside AO(s)	JFC or JFACC	JFACC: no additional coord required once established.	JAOC - Airspace Mgr	Air to Surface	ACM Air Deconfliction
- Beyond FB		Other components: Must coordinate with JFACC.	- TST Cell - SODO - BCD		Clearance Inherent
BLUE KILL BOX - Inside AO(s)	Supported Commnader		- Airspace Mgr - TST Cell - SODO	Air to Surface	ACM FSCM Air Deconfliction Clearance Inherent
with IEACC before use	- BCD JFLCC - DOCC/FSE				
		Other components: Must coordinate with JFLCC and JFACC.	- ASOC/DASC		
PURPLE KILL BOX - Synchronized Fires	JFC or appropriate component Cdr	JFC and/or other Components	JOC/JFE - Other Components as required	Joint Fires - Altitude, lateral, or Time Separation	ACM FSCM Deconfliction Clearance as Required

<sup>1</sup> The establishing authority (EA) works in coordination with other Components as required before changing current battle space measures.

5

Table II-1. Kill Box Responsibilities

1	Chapter III
2	KILL BOX EXECUTION

### 3 **1. Execution of Kill Box Operations**

Kill box execution begins with the establishment of a kill box by a supported commander. The
nature of kill box operation execution is dependant on two factors: the method by which a kill box is
established (either planned or immediate), and types of fires to be delivered (either joint surface-tosurface and air-to-surface fires or pure air-to-surface fires).

8 9

# 2. Establishment and Cancellation of a Kill Box

a. Kill box establishment and cancellation require detailed coordination and dissemination
 between supported and supporting commanders within the JOA. The establishment of planned or
 immediate kill boxes will use existing theater command, control, communications, and computer
 systems. During execution, communications nets between C2 and air assets providing air-to-surface
 fires will be clearly established and used to terminate operations in a timely manner if necessary.

15 b. The supported commander initiates the establishment of a kill box through their operational 16 C2 organization. They will coordinate their action with the operation airspace control authority 17 (ACA); who is typically, but not always, the joint force air component commander (JFACC). Coordination will include consultation with the JFACC's representatives on the impacts and details of 18 19 the kill box. Example: The joint force land component commander (JFLCC) wants to establish a kill 20 box in his/her operational area. Prior to establishing the kill box, the JFLCC will coordinate the impacts and details of the kill box with ASOC/joint air operations center (JAOC) via the fire support 21 element (FSE). 22

KILL BOX REQUEST FORMAT Purpose: Geographic limits/kill box location: Effective times of establishment: Identify the date time group (DTG) the kill box is established • Identify the DTG or the desired effect that will cancel the hill box • Kill Box Type: \_\_\_\_ (*Identify whether it is blue or purple*) Establishing Authority: \_\_\_\_ (*Identify the establishing authority*) Supported Commander's Targeting Guidance: Priorities: List the targets Effects: Identify the desired effects . Identify restrictions • Remarks: (*Give any additional information needed*)

#### 2

# Figure III-1. Kill Box Request Format

# **3 3. Contingencies and Considerations**

4 a. The kill box is designed to provide a solution to the requirement for coordination of lethal 5 fires. However, non-lethal fires such as electronic attack may be employed to facilitate fires and 6 provide synergy of prosecution of a given target across the entire operational spectrum of a given 7 target. Every attempt should be made to bring to bear all capabilities against a given target set to 8 ensure its efficient destruction.

b. Additionally, kill box operations in the vicinity of joint air defense assets can adversely affect
the capabilities of the air defense system to operate as intended by the area air defense commander
(AADC). Consult the air defense commander (ADC) prior to establishing a kill box in the vicinity of
a joint air defense asset.

# **4. Coordinating Active Kill Box Operations**

Kill box coordination is required when multiple flights or formations are operating within or
providing air-to-surface fires within the same kill box. This coordination may be as simple as
deconflicting two flights or as complex as performing SCAR. At a minimum, this coordination must
deconflict flight paths and weapons deliveries.

a. The functions associated with kill box coordination should not be confused with those of the
FAC(A). FAC(A)s are a direct extension of a tactical air control party (TACP) and specifically
facilitate the conduct of CAS. Flights providing kill box coordination will not normally provide
terminal attack control for kill box operations. However, rapidly changing circumstances could
require FAC(A)s to provide terminal attack control for CAS missions. In this case, the kill box or
portions thereof will be closed and CAS procedures will be used.

b. Unless previously coordinated, the first flight to enter a given kill box will be responsible for providing the required kill box coordination. As the complexity of the kill box environment begins to exceed airframe capability or the flight's training or comfort level, that flight should seek to pass the responsibility for providing kill box coordination to a more qualified flight. FAC(A)s or SCARtrained flights are ideally suited and prepared to provide all of the capabilities described above. If no FAC(A), SCAR, RMC, or mission commander is available, the most qualified flight lead will become the KBC and will only be responsible for kill box deconfliction.

- c. Once positive deconfliction has been established, kill box coordination may include some orall of the following:
- 21 (1) Expeditiously flowing interdiction aircraft into and out of the target area.
- 22 (2) Attempting to match weapons with targets and targeting priorities.
- 23 (3) Preventing redundant strikes against targets previously destroyed.
- 24 (4) Providing targeting information, to include accurate coordinates and PID.
- 25 (5) Providing target marks.
- 26 (6) Supporting laser-guided weapons.
- 27 (7) Confirming or locating surface-to-air threats.
- 28 (8) Providing battle damage assessment (BDA)/bomb hit assessment (BHA).
- 29

# **5.** Command, Control, and Communications/Kill Box Operations

Radio Procedures. Flights will check in with C2 agencies in accordance with (IAW) theater
SPINS. Once authorized to proceed towards a given kill box, flights must check in with the agency
or flight providing kill box coordination prior to entering that kill box. Recommended check-in and
briefing formats are provided below. The applicable information from each format should be passed.
At a minimum, the C2 agency will pass kill box location, status, coordinator and frequency, friendlies
and threats.

a. C2 agency Check-in Standard IAW Theater SPINS. As time and conditions permit,
 amplifying information may be passed including some or all of the following (Figure III-2).

4

1

COMMAND & CONTROL (C2) AGENCY BRIEFING Information passed from C2 Agency to Aircraft
Aircraft: ", this is"
(C2 Agency Call Sign) (Aircraft Call Sign)
Targets: ""
(priorities, targets being worked, restricted targets, etc.)
Threats: ""
Friendlies: ""
(all applicable air and ground assets in vicinity of kill box)
Fires Integration: ""
Coordinator: ""
(call sign and net)
Ordnance Restrictions or Requests: ""
Remarks: ""
Example:
"Kmart 00, Razor 22 checking in as fragged."
"Razor 22, this is Kmart 00, proceed to 7F and contact Badger 11 on TAD-2, multiple aircraft on station, possible SA-8 keypad 5."
Figure III-2. Command and Control (C2) Agency Briefing

2

# b. Kill Box Check-in Briefing (figure III-3)

KILL BOX CHECK-IN BRIEFING Passed to Kill Box Coordinator (KBC) Before Entering	ţ	
Aircraft: ", this is	,, -	
(KBC Call Sign) (Aircraft Call Sign)		
Call Sign/Mission Number: "		
Number and Type of Aircraft: "		
Position and Altitude: "		
Ordnance: "		
(laser codes as applicable)		
Time on Station: "		
Additional Aircraft/Aircrew Capabilities: "		
Remarks: "		
Example:		
"Badger 11, this is Razor 22, mission #3601, flight of 2 x AV-8s, 50NM south angels 26, 3 GBU-12s and Litening, 20 minutes playtime."		

Figure III-3. Kill Box Check-In Briefing

2 c. KBC to Fighter Brief/Check-In (figure III-4)

KBC TO FIGHTER Passed fr		
Aircraft: "	_, this is	
(Aircraft Call Sign)	(KBC Call Sign)	
Deconfliction Plan: "		
Threats: "		
Kill Box Status and Restrictions: "		,,
Friendlies: "		
(all applicable air and ground a	ussets in kill box)	
Remarks: "		
Example:		
"Razor 22, this is Badger 11, descend to an Ripper 33, established angels 18, keypads 1, 2, a 7F5, advise when ready to copy attack brief."		

Figure III-4. KBC to Fighter Brief/Check-In

2

### d. Kill Box Attack Brief (figure III-5)

KILL BOX ATTACK BRIEF KBC to Striker Aircraft		
Aircraft: ", this is"		
(KBC Call Sign) (Strike Aircraft Call Sign)		
Target Description: ""		
Target Location: ""		
(coordinates, geo refs, etc.))		
Target Elevation: ""		
Remarks: ""		
(buddy-lase plan, mark, time-on-target (TOT), deconfliction, etc.)		
<i>NOTE:</i> Once established in the kill box with flight and weapon deconfliction assured, authorization to engage targets is assumed once the following measures have been satisfied by the flight:		
• PID		
FSCMs Restrictions		
Collateral Damage Estimates (CDE)		
No-strike Lists/Restricted Target List		
• ROE/SPINS		
Example:		
"Razor 22 Ready to copy."		
"Column of 4 APCs oriented north to south with dismounted infantry, location N3701.034 / W07601.089, elevation 69', remain in 7F keypad 9, contact Badger 11 once complete."		

3

# Figure III-5. Kill Box Attack Brief

e. Departing KBCs will execute a positive handoff to the appropriate flight, if applicable, and
notify C2. If no flights are available, the KBC will execute a positive handoff with C2.

1	Appendix A
2	KILL BOX REQUEST MATRIX

- 3 1. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) Requesting Immediate
- 4 Kill Box





Figure A-1. JFACC Requesting Immediate Kill Box Decision Flow Chart





#### 2 Figure A-2. Army Maneuver Unit Requesting Immediate Kill Box Decision Flow Chart

The Army maneuver unit requesting an immediate kill box decision flow chart is a tool to be used by the staff to expedite the establishment of an immediate kill box. Prior to being used, the flow chart should be adjusted to reflect the current situation. If used correctly, the flow chart will provide the staff an overview of the decisions to be made and the coordination required to open an immediate kill box.

8 a. The fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) in consultation with the G3/S3 and air liaison
9 officer (ALO) recommend that a kill box be established.

1	b. Is the kill box in your unit's AO – Yes?
2	(1) Can G3/S3 confirm that there are no friendly within the area of the kill box?
3	(a) If yes, the kill box recommendation goes forward.
4 5	(b) If no, the G3/S3 and the FSCOORD must make recommendations for additional FSCMs to protect those troops.
6 7	(2) Can the air defense artillery (ADA) LNO confirm that the kill box will have no adverse impact on the ADA's ability to protect the force?
8	(a) If yes, the kill box recommendation goes forward.
9	(b) If no, the ADA LNO must provide a risk assessment to the commander.
10 11	(3) Can the ALO/TACP ensure that the kill box establishment will not adversely effect air operations in support of the maneuver force or JFLCC operations?
12	(a) If yes, the kill box recommendation goes forward.
13 14	(b) If no, the ALO LNO must provide a risk assessment to the commander along with his recommendations.
15 16	(4) Weighing all the information and recommendations the maneuver commander makes his decision on establishing the kill box.
17 18	(a) If yes, the kill box information is sent by the FSE to the Army forces (ARFOR) FSE.
19	(b) If no, the kill box is not established.
20	c. Is the kill box in you unit's AO – No?
21 22 23	(1) The FSE coordinates with the commander of the AO where the kill box is to be located and recommends that a kill box be established. Provides all the information concerning the establishment of the kill box.
24	(2) The staff of the affected commander performs steps in b.(1), (2) and (3).
25	d. Does the affected component commander approve the establishment of a kill box in his AO?
26	(1) If yes, the kill box information is sent by the FSE to the ARFOR FSE.
27	(2) If no, the kill box is not established.
28	e. Can the ARFOR clear the kill box for all friendly forces, e.g. SOF, OGA, etc.
29 30	(1) If yes, the kill box information is disseminated to all component commanders prior to establishment.
31	(2) If no, the ARFOR FSE must establish additional FSCMs to protect those forces.

**3.** Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Ground Combat Element (GCE)

# 2 Requesting Immediate Kill Box




Figure A-3. MAGTF GCE Requesting Immediate Kill Box Decision Flow Chart

**4.** Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Requesting an

# 2 Immediate Kill Box






Figure A-4. JFMCC Requesting Immediate Kill Box Decision Flow Chart

4 The JFMCC immediate kill box decision flow chart is a tool to be used by the JFMCC staff to 5 expedite establishing an immediate kill box. Prior to being used, the flow chart should be changed to

1 2	reflect the current situation. If used correctly, the flow chart will provide the JFMCC staff an overview of the decisions to be made and the coordination required to open an immediate kill box.
3	a. Is the kill box in the JFMCC AO? – Yes
4	(1) Does the JFMCC control the airspace enveloped by the kill box?
5	(a) If yes, the ADC clears the airspace enveloped by the kill box.
6 7 8	(b) If no, the ADC coordinates with the airspace control authority (e.g., Chief of Combat Operations [CCO] working for the JFACC in the JAOC) to clear the airspace enveloped by the kill box.
9	(c) Are JFMCC organic assets available?
10	• If yes, a kill box is not established.
11 12	• If no, the JFMCC requests forces from other component commanders as supporting assets.
13	(2) Do the other component commanders provide supporting assets to the JFMCC?
14 15	(a) If yes, the kill box information (location, time established/cancelled, etc.) is disseminated to all component commanders prior to establishment.
16	(b) If no, a kill box is not established.
17	b. Is the kill box in the JFMCC area of operations (AO)? – No
18 19	(1) JFMCC Current Operations coordinates with the affected component commander to establish a kill box.
20 21	(2) Does the affected component commander approve the establishment of a kill box in his/her AO.
22 23 24	(a) If yes, the kill box information (location, time established/cancelled, etc.) is disseminated to all component commanders prior to establishment in the affected component commander's AO.
25	(b) If no, a kill box is not established.
26	

1	Appendix B
2 3 4	COMPONENT COMMANDERS KILL BOX COORDINATION EXAMPLES

#### 5 1. Kill Box Execution: Examples of Cross-component Coordination

6 The following mission examples demonstrate how the kill box process can be implemented 7 across components. The examples explore different possibilities and illustrate key concepts in

8 coordination of kill boxes, but are not intended to be all-inclusive.

9




Figure B-1. JFLCC as the supported commander activates planned and immediate kill boxes

#### 1 2. JFLCC Planned Kill Box Example

2 a. The Corps Commander's staff during the military decision-making process (MDMP) has 3 identified an area of expected enemy concentrations of armored forces in areas well beyond the 4 forward line of own troops (FLOT) and beyond the expected movement of friendly forces for the next 5 48 hours. Intending to shape the battle space, the FSCOORD and ALO recommend that the Corps 6 Commander establish a kill box over the area. This will allow air assets to attack enemy targets 7 without further coordination. The kill box will not adversely affect ADA coverage for the corps. 8 (See Figure B-1, blue kill box.) They submit the following kill box request: 9 (1) Purpose: To destroy enemy armor assets in the area and degrade enemy forces for the 10 friendly forces. 11 (2) Geographic limits/kill box location: Using the area reference system, the entire cell 24K 12 is identified as a kill box. 13 (3) Effective times of establishment:

- 14 (a) Established at 0600Z 24Aug04
- 15 (b) Cancelled 0600Z 26Aug04 or on-order
- 16 (4) Kill Box Type: BLUE

19

- 17 (5) Establishing Authority: Corps
- 18 (6) Supported Commander's Targeting Guidance:
  - (a) Priorities: Tanks, ADA, and armored vehicles.
- 20 (b) Effects: Destroy/neutralize when found.
- 21 (c) Restrictions: Do not destroy bridges or road networks. No scatterable munitions 22 near bridges, roads, or road intersections.

23 (7) Remarks: No friendlies are within the proposed kill box. NFAs have been established 24 around restricted and no-strike targets.

#### 25 3. JFLCC Immediate Kill Box Example


26 a. During shore operations, the headquarters of the MAGTF receives intelligence reports 27 concerning stationary and advancing enemy forces within their AOR. The enemy armored and 28 mechanized units are short of the FSCL but beyond but beyond the BCL and the range of Marine 29 organic indirect fires. The FSCOORD and air officer recommend that a purple kill box be established 30 immediately to bring maximum joint fires to bear on the target. The The JFLCC (MEF commander) 31 agrees and establishes the kill box. (See Figure B-1, purple kill box) A message is prepared with the following information: 32

33 (1) Purpose: To destroy enemy armor and mechanized forces before they reach Marine Corps 34 units.

35 (2) Geographic limits/kill box location: Using the area reference system, the quadrant 26G5SW is identified as a kill box. 36

- 37 (3) Effective Times:
- 38 (a) Established: Immediately

- 1 (b) Cancelled: On-order
- 2 (4) Kill Box Type: PURPLE, min alt 12,000 ft MSL max alt 25,000 ft MSL.
- 3 (5) Establishing authority: MEF
  - (6) Supported Commander's Targeting Guidance:
    - (a) Priorities: Tanks, armored vehicles, artillery
    - (b) Effects: Destroy. Do not destroy bridges or road networks.
- 7 (7) Remarks: No friendlies are within the proposed kill box. There are no restricted or no
- 8 strike targets within the kill box.



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Figure B-2. JFMCC as the supported commander activates planned and immediate kill boxes

# **4. JFMCC Planned Kill Box Example**

a. A Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) level amphibious assault is scheduled to take place in 5 days within an amphibious objective area (AOA) designated by the JFC. The intelligence section of the command element briefs the GCE commander (Regimental Combat Team [RCT] commanding officer [CO]) on an enemy high speed armor avenue of approach into the AOA. The RCT CO

1 determines the need to shape the amphibious landing area in preparation for the amphibious assault. 2 His/her fire support coordinator and air officer recommend establishing a purple kill box over the 3 area. This will allow for air assets and naval surface fire support (NSFS) to engage targets in the area 4 without further coordination. The ADC staff determines the kill box will not affect the air defense of 5 the AOA. (See Figure B-2, purple kill box) The RCT CO purple kill box request is based on the 6 following information: 7 (1) Purpose: To destroy enemy armor assets in the area and prohibit enemy forces from 8 approaching the beachhead area. 9 (2) Geographic limits/kill box location: Using the area reference system, the entire keypad 10 29W is identified as a kill box. 11 (3) Effective Times: 12 (a) Established at 0600Z D-3 13 (b) Cancelled at 0600Z D-Day (4) Kill Box Type: PURPLE 14 15 (5) Establishing Authority: RCT 16 (6) Supported Commander's Targeting Guidance: 17 (a) Priorities: Tanks, armored vehicles, artillery 18 (b) Effects: Destroy. Do not destroy bridges or road networks. No scatterable munitions near bridges, roads, or road intersections 19 20 (7) Remarks: No friendlies are within the proposed kill box. NFAs have been established 21 around restricted and no-strike targets.

# 22 **5. JFMCC Immediate Kill Box Example:**


23 a. A P-3 on a maritime patrol mission identifies an enemy ship (a submarine) being loaded with mines in a port facility. The P-3 reports its findings to the strike warfare commander (SWC) watch, 24 25 in the Combat Division Center (CDC). The SWC watch simultaneously relays the information to JFMCC Current Operations in the Maritime Operating Center (MOC) and looks for a surface asset to 26 27 intercept the submarine prior to getting underway. JFMCC Current Operations tasks the strike 28 warfare commander (SWC) watch (Bravo Papa) to locate a direct-use aircraft for tasking. JFMCC's 29 Current Operations receives the following information from Bravo Papa and the SWC watch: no 30 aircraft are available for a potential strike, and the closest naval combatant ship has a 5-hour transit 31 time to intercept the submarine. (See Figure B-2)


b. In addition to no-strike aircraft or surface combatants to engage the submarine, there are no
preplanned Tomahawk missions for the port facility. JFMCC Current Operations determines to most
expeditious method of destroying the enemy submarine prior to getting underway is to establish and
activate a blue kill box over the submarine for JFACC air assets to engage. JFMCC Current
Operations coordinates with the JFACC chief of combat operations (CCO) and passes the following
information to establish and activate the blue kill box and request air assets for engagement:

38 (1) Purpose: To destroy enemy submarine being loaded with mines in a port facility.

39 (2) Geographic limits/kill box location: Using the area reference system, the submarine and
 40 the channel out of the port facility are identified as the kill box due to the unknown underway time of
 41 the submarine: 31P7.

1	(3) Effective Times:
2	(a) Established at 261000ZAug04
3	(b) Cancelled at 261500ZAug04 or on-order
4	(4) Kill Box Type: BLUE
5	(5) Establishing Authority: JFMCC
6	(6) Supported Commander's Targeting Guidance:
7	(a) Priorities: Kilo submarine alongside pier in port facility, or underway;
8	mines on pier in port facility, convoy vehicles carrying mine shapes in port facility.
9	(b) Effects: Destroy. Do not destroy avenues of approach or port facilities.
10	No cluster munitions.







# **6. JFACC Planned Kill Box Example**

a. Recent JFACC intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) trending data has determined that several potential enemy assembly areas are operating in a geographic region past the forward boundary. The JAOC ISR Division (ISRD) forwards this information through appropriate intelligence representatives in the Combat Plans Division teams for kill box consideration in the planning of the air tasking order (ATO). The JFACC is the supported commander for this example and was given the authority for kill box establishment within the specified area of the JOA by the JFC.

b. Within the Combat Plans Division, the target effects team (TET) and master air attack plan
(MAAP) team determine that a planned kill box is necessary to posture air power in the vicinity to
exploit the intelligence data. This will allow a permissive environment for air-to-surface fires over a
specified area of the battlespace.

c. In this example (See Figure B-3), the Combat Plans division (MAAP team) determines that a
 kill box should be established over the area suspected of containing enemy assembly areas and
 processes the request with the following information:

16 (1) Purpose: To destroy enemy assets in the area and degrade enemy forces for the friendly17 forces.

18 (2) Geographic limits/kill box location: Using area reference system, cell 26P is identified asa kill box.

- 20 (3) Effective Times:
- 21 (a) Established: 240600ZAug04
- 22 (b) Cancelled: 250600ZAug04
- 23 (4) Kill Box Type: BLUE
- 24 (5) Establishing Authority: JFACC
- 25 (6) Supported Commander's Targeting Guidance:
- 26 (a) Priorities: Tanks, armored vehicles, military-type vehicles, troop concentrations,
- and ADA.
- (b) Effects: Destroy when found. Do not destroy bridges or road networks. No
   scatterable munitions near bridges, roads, or road intersections.
- 30 (7) Remarks: No friendlies are within the proposed kill box. NFAs have been established
   around restricted and no-strike targets.

d. The first set of assets in the kill box, serving as the KBC is a 2-ship of F-15Es (call sign
Rocket 01) equipped with Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared, Night (LANTIRN) pods.
The Predator (call sign Toy 51) enters the kill box and Rocket 01 establishes a kill box floor of
14,000 feet MSL to allow the Predator to operate unrestricted at 13,000 feet MSL. Further, Rocket 01
has Toy 51 concentrate its search efforts on Keypads 7-9 of the kill box.

e. Toy 51 locates enemy troops in the open and several stopped tanks and armored vehicles in an adjacent tree line. Rocket 01 queries Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) if there are any additional assets available to work with Predator while it continues to search the other keypads within the kill box. AWACS notifies Rocket 01 that currently there is a 2-ship of F-14s (call sign Voodoo 33) available and en route. Rocket 01 advises AWACS to bring the F-14s into Keypads 7-9 to work with the Predator at 15,000 feet MSL and maintain 17,000 feet MSL in the north.

f. Voodoo 33 arrives in the kill box and begins working with the Predator receiving talk-ons to
 the target. The PID is established by Voodoo 33 and the CDE for the troops in the open is low.
 However, there is a collateral damage estimate (CDE) concern for two of the armored vehicles
 adjacent to a building that appears to be used for unknown storage.

5 g. Voodoo 33 engages any positively identified enemy targets meeting the low CDE criteria 6 while they confer with the JAOC regarding the medium CDE targets.

h. With the CDE issue from AWACS, the senior operations duty officer (SODO) confers with
the CCO and appropriate combat operations team members regarding the collateral damage and gains
approval to engage the remaining armored vehicles while minimizing damage to the nearby building.

i. The SODO notifies AWACS of the approval to engage the remaining armored vehicles with
 associated caveats. The AWACS, in turn, relays this information to the F-14s who comply.

j. Rocket 01 has now located what they believe are tanks on the move in Keypad 3 of the kill
 box. However, they are unable to PID via their LANTIRN pods and intermittent cloud cover below
 them is obscuring their view. They notify AWACS of their findings.

15 k. AWACS coordinates tactically to bring in a 2-ship of F-16s (call sign Snake 21) with Sniper 16 Pods to assist the F-15Es. As Snake 21 flight checks-in, Rocket 01 advises AWACS and the F-16s 17 that Rocket 01 is joker and en route to air refuel. Rocket 01 gives a point out of its tank activity and a 18 kill box update to Snake 21, to include the activity of the Predator and F-14s in Keypads 7-9. Rocket 19 01 further deconflicts its outbound altitude with that of the inbound Snake flight.

Snake 21 locates the tank column in Keypad 3 and PID via their Sniper Pods as enemy T-72
 tanks. The CDE is low so they begin their engagements.

m. Once the engagements are over, inflight reports will be provided to AWACS prior to striker
 check-out. AWACS will relay the in-flight reports to the JAOC via the SODO.

## 24 **7. JFACC Immediate Kill Box Example**

25 a. An E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) has detected several movements out of a suspected surface-to-surface missile system (SCUD) hide site that meets 26 reporting criteria within a known joint special operations area (JSOA). The JFACC determines that 27 28 the JSTARS tracks are potentially valid. The JFACC has appropriate weapon-target paired assets 29 available to engage the target tracks if they prove to be valid targets after PID. The JFACC has 30 determined that a kill box is necessary to rapidly open up the battlespace to allow a permissive 31 environment for air-to-surface fires over an expanding area. Due to the JSOA, the JFSOCC is the 32 supported commander and the JFACC is the supporting commander in this example. (See Figure B-33 3)

b. The JFACC has an imagery sensor focused in the JSOA seeking to locate potential SCUD
 activity suspected to be operating in the area. A JSTARS is currently tracking several "movers" away
 from a suspected SCUD hide site within the JSOA and requires assistance to determine identification
 and potential courses of action.


c. Within the JAOC, the JFACC's senior intelligence duty officer (SIDO) confers with the
SODO to determine that assets are available to send for investigation of the JSTARS tracks. The
SODO will request through the CCO that a blue kill box be established over the area of the JSTARS
reported tracks. The CCO will then request approval through the special operations liaison element
(SOLE) within the JAOC. JSOTF (or SOLE) will forward kill box approval/restrictions to the theater
kill box manager (BCD OPS) for input into display systems (automated deep operations coordination)

1 system [ADOCS], C2PC, etc.) that can be viewed by all component HO nodes. For purposes of this 2 example, the request for kill box activation is based upon the established area reference system and 3 will be prepared with the following information as an example: 4 (1) Purpose: To destroy enemy SCUD assets in the area. 5 (2) Geographic limits/kill box location: Using area reference system, the cell 24Z is identified 6 as a kill box. 7 (3) Effective Times: 8 (a) Established: Immediately 9 (b) Cancelled: On Order 10 (4) Kill Box Type: BLUE 11 (5) Establishing Authority: JFACC 12 (6) Supported Commander's Targeting Guidance: 13 (a) Priorities: SCUD missiles, SCUD- transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), missile 14 transporters, SCUD-related support equipment, and ADA. 15 (b) Effects: Destroy. Do not destroy bridges or road networks. No scatterable 16 munitions near bridges, roads, or road intersections. 17 (7) Remarks: No known information on friendlies operating within the proposed kill box. There are no restricted or no-strike targets within the kill box. 18 19 d. The SOLE will subsequently coordinate with the affected JSOTF FSE in the JSOA to gain 20 approval for the establishment of a blue kill box within the JSOA. The JSOTF will either approve or 21 disapprove the JFACC's request. 22 e. After approval, the JSOTF will relay to the SOLE their concurrence for the blue kill box 23 establishment along with any restrictions. The SOLE then relays the approval to the CCO in the 24 JAOC. The restrictions for this example include a single closed keypad within the kill box grid, 25 24Z1. There is a special operations forces (SOF) unit operating within that keypad, call sign Torpedo 26 24 on TAD 159 frequency. 27 f. The CCO will then notify both the SIDO and SODO of the kill box establishment and 28 amplifying information. The SODO will relay the kill box establishment to appropriate tactical 29 command and control nodes to include the JSTARS with instructions to assign available assets to 30 investigate the reported tracks. 31 g. JSTARS tasks both a 2-ship of F-16s, call sign Python 01, and a 2-ship of F-15Es, call sign 32 Hoss 11, to investigate two of the tracks within the now established blue kill box 24Z. Since Hoss 11 33 flight is closer and will arrive first, they will assume control of kill box coordination with all other air 34 assets once established. 35 h. Upon arrival, Hoss 11 notifies the JSTARS that they will be operating at 17,000 feet MSL 36 and to have Python 01 flight enter and maintain 19,000 feet MSL. Hoss 11 locates and identifies one 37 of the JSTARS tracks as an enemy SA-6 on the move. PID requirements are met and the CDE is low. 38 Since there will be additional air assets arriving in the area shortly (the F-16s), Hoss 11 elects to 39 engage the SA-6 even though it is not a SCUD entity. 40 i. JSTARS notifies Python 01 of Hoss 11's kill box coordination plan. Upon kill box entry, 41 Python 01 locates their JSTARS provided track and identifies it as an enemy SCUD-TEL with missile 42 that has just turned off-road. The flight lead determines the CDE to be low but the location is

adjacent to the closed keypad within the kill box, 24Z1. Python 01 elects to coordinate tactically with
 Torpedo 24 to ensure deconfliction prior to engagement of the SCUD-TEL.

3 j. Upon successful engagements of the SA-6 and SCUD-TEL, the flight leads of both the F-

- 4 15Es and F-16s notify the JSTARS via an in-flight report. JSTARS continues working with the F-
- 5 15Es and F-16s to investigate additional tracks of interest within the kill box.
- 6 k. Upon receipt of the F-15Es and F-16s in-flight report from the JSTARS to the SODO
- 7 validating SCUD activity within kill box 24Z, the JFACC continues to coordinate with the SOLE to
- 8 maintain 24Z as an established, open blue kill box for the near term in order to continue to
- 9 investigative for engagement activity within the kill box.



10Figure B-4. Planned and immediate kill boxes beyond the forward boundary in support of11JFSOCC operations

## 12 8. JFSOCC Planned Kill Box Example


13 a. Foot and vehicle traffic have been reported by a reliable source along the border of friendly

14 and hostile nation states. It is believed that this area is being used by hostile forces as an infiltration

- and ex-filtration point for the delivery of supplies and personnel to the combat area. It is
- 16 recommended by the Army special operations task force (ARSOTF) to the JFSOCC that an

1 Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) be inserted to observe the area and report observations and 2 findings to the JFSOCC. A JSOA has been designated in support of the ODA with established kill 3 boxes encompassing the reported movement of enemy forces. (See Figure B-4) 4 (1) Purpose: To destroy personnel and equipment infiltrating the combat area from a hostile 5 state's recognized international border. 6 (2) Geographic limits/kill box location: Using the area reference system, the entire cell of 24Z 7 is identified as a kill box. 8 (3) Effective Times 9 (a) Established at 240600Z Aug04 10 (b) Cancelled at 261500Z Aug04 or on-order 11 (4) Kill Box Type: BLUE 12 (5) Establishing Authority: JFSOCC 13 (6) Supported Commander's Targeting Guidance: 14 (a) Priorities: Personnel, equipment, vehicles, and pack animals. 15 (b) Effects: Destroy when found. 16 (7) Remarks: No friendlies are within the proposed kill box. NFAs have been established around restricted and no-strike targets. NFAs have been established around SOF team in vicinity of 17 18 kill box. JFSOCC notifies all component commanders through their liaison elements: 19 (a) SOLE at the JFACC 20 (b) Special operations command and control element (SOCCE) at the JFLCC 21 (c) Naval special warfare task unit (NSWTU) at the JFMCC 22 (d) Liaison officer (LNO) at the JFC 9. JFSOCC Immediate Kill Box Example 23 24 a. ODA has been given the mission of strategic reconnaissance. While performing this mission 25 the ODA has come upon an insurgent force in the open that appears to be rehearsing actions on an 26 objective. There appears to be two to five individuals of importance observing. The ODA 27 commander believes that there are at least two of these individuals that have been designated as high priority targets (HPTs) by the President or Secretary of Defense. The ODA commander has requested 28 29 an immediate kill box be established. The ODA commander has requested that the kill box not be 30 opened until at least 30 minutes after approval to give the ODA time to vacate the immediate area. 31 JFSOCC staff receives and acknowledges the request and passes it on to the JFSOCC. JFSOCC 32 approves and establishes an immediate purple kill box. JFSOCC directs the ODA upon cancellation 33 of the kill box to conduct a BHA of the attack. The JFSOCC staff sends out the following 34 information. (See Figure B-4) 35 (1) Purpose: To destroy HPTs and other combatant personnel and equipment. 36 (2) Geographic limits/kill box location: Using the area reference system, the entire quarter of 24Y7SW is identified as a kill box. 37 38 (3) Effective Times 39 (a) Established at 240630Z Aug04

1	(b) Cancelled on-order
2	(4) Kill Box Type: PURPLE
3	(5) Establishing Authority: JFSOCC
4	(6) Supported Commander's Targeting Guidance:
5 6	(a) Priorities: Personnel identified as HPTs. Other combatant personnel and equipment. Training camp.
7	(b) Effects: Destroy
8 9 10	(7) Remarks: No friendlies are within the kill box after 0630Z. There are no restricted and no-strike targets with-in the kill box. NFA have been established around SOF team in vicinity of kill box. JFSOCC notifies all component commanders through their liaison elements:
11	(a) SOLE at the JFSOCC
12	(b) SOCCE at the JFLCC
13	(c) NSWTU at the JFMCC
14	(d) LNO at the JFC



15 Figure B-5. ASOC-directed Employment of CAS Assets in an Interdiction Role in a Kill Box

# 10. ASOC-Directed Employment of CAS Assets in an Interdiction Role in a Kill Box

3 a. The corps airborne control element (ACE) receives intelligence reports concerning advancing 4 enemy forces. The enemy armored and mechanized units are short of the FSCL but beyond the range 5 of corps organic indirect fires and deep employment of rotary wing assets would take too long. The 6 enemy forces are located in a blue kill box. CAS missions have been allocated to the corps. The 7 FSC and ALO determine that the only assets capable of interdicting the enemy forces are a series of 8 CAS missions supporting the corps in the current ATO; no interdiction sorties can be diverted and 9 there are no other assets available. The FSCOORD and the ALO recommend that the CAS missions 10 be directed to interdict the enemy forces in the kill box. The combat operations section at the JAOC agrees and notifies the E-3 AWACS to coordinate tactical command and control in the kill box. (See 11 12 Figure B-5) A message is prepared with the following information:

13 (1) Pur

(1) Purpose: To destroy enemy armor and mechanized forces before they reach corps units.

(2) Geographic limits/kill box location: Using the area reference system, the active kill box isconfirmed as 26G5SW.

- 16 (3) Effective Times:
- 17

23

24

(a) Established: Confirms KB 26G5SW.


- (b) Cancelled: As defined when established (modified as necessary to support currentrequirements).
- 20 (4) Kill Box Type: BLUE
- 21 (5) Established Authority: Corps
- 22 (6) Supported Commander's Targeting Guidance:
  - (a) Priorities: Tanks, and armored vehicles.
  - (b) Effects: Destroy. Do not damage bridges or road networks.
- (7) Remarks: No friendlies are within the proposed kill box. There are no restrictions or no strike targets within the kill box.

27 b. Upon coordination with the JAOC, the information is also forwarded by the FSE to the 28 JFLCC deep operation coordination cell (DOCC)/FSE and BCD, for situational awareness. The FSE 29 verifies that the kill box exists in AFATDS. The ASOC directs selected CAS missions into the kill 30 box to interdict enemy forces IAW corps priorities. The ASOC identifies an available mission to 31 conduct coordination within the kill box and directs other missions to the kill box for attack. Upon completion of mission the ASOC informs the JAOC of all CAS missions that were diverted and 32 relays any available mission reports (MISREPS) for those missions. FSE notifies the JFLCC 33 34 DOCC/FSE and BCD of mission completion and passes any results available at completion.

Appendix C 1

#### SUPPORTED COMMANDERS C2 FOR KILL BOX OPERATIONS 2

#### 3 This illustration (See Figure C-1) is used throughout this appendix to portray possible kill boxes 4 that can be established throughout the AOR for a JTF's functional component commanders.



5

Figure C-1. Example of component commander Kill box in JFC AOR

#### 6 1. JFLCC C2 for Planned Kill Box Operations

7 a. Figure C-1 depicts examples of blue and purple kill boxes within the C2 of the JFLCC's area 8 of operation.

9 b. Once approved by the Corps Commander/JFLCC, the kill box is forwarded to the JFLCC

10 DOCC/FSE and BCD which informs the JFACC's JAOC. The corps DOCC/FSE informs all field

11 artillery, air defense and army aviation units of the kill box. The field artillery units create an

12 Airspace Coordination Area in AFATDS for cell 24K from surface to the standard kill box height as

13 identified in the SPINS (e.g. 25,000 ft MSL). This prevents the trajectory from any surface-to-surface

14 fire from passing through the kill box without further coordination. Air defense identifies the kill box

15 as a weapons hold area (HIDACZ, weapons control status "Hold") and army airspace command and 16 control (A2C2) cell identifies the kill box for restricted operations that will prevent transient

- 1 helicopters from entering the airspace. The corps operations officer (G3) creates a phase line at some
- 2 distance from the kill box that will alert him to the unexpected arrival of friendly troops triggering
- 3 cancellation of the kill box before the established time if required. Diagram below (See Figure C-2)
- 4 depicts the ARFOR as the JFLCC and it's C2 flow for a planned kill box.






Figure C-2. JFLCC's Planned Kill Box Operational C2 Flow

# 6 2. JFLCC C2 for Immediate Kill Box Operations

a. Figure C-1 depicts examples of blue and purple kill boxes within the C2 of the JFLCC's area
of operation.

9 b. The MEF FFCC immediately informs the JFLCC DOCC/FSE via AFATDS/ADOCS of the 10 establishment of the kill box. The BCD is notified by the same message and passes the information to the JAOC. The FFCC inputs the kill box information into AFATDS. This ensures that all Marine 11 12 and Army artillery FSE/fire support coordination centers (FSCCs) and fire direction centers (FDC)s 13 are notified. The trajectories of surface-to-surface fires will not enter the restricted airspace (12000 – 14 25000 ft MSL) of the kill box. Trajectories below the kill box minimum altitude (12000 ft MSL) are 15 allowed and multiple Army indirect surface-to-surface assets are directed to engage the enemy forces. 16 The Marine division (MARDIV) air officer notifies the DASC (voice or chat) of the establishment of 17 the kill box and recommends maximum application of airpower against the enemy forces in addition to the Army artillery preparing to engage. The tactical air command center (TACC) also receives kill 18 19 box information and relays it to the DASC and the JAOC (BCD OPS). The TACC could delegate 20 divert authority to the DASC to expedite attack of targets in the kill box. The DASC identifies an

- 1 available flight to conduct coordination within the kill box and assigns another flight to the kill box
- 2 for attack. Diagram below (See Figure C-3) depicts the Marine Corps forces (MARFOR) as the
- 3 JFLCC and it's C2 flow for a immediate kill box.






Figure C-3. JFLCC's Immediate Kill Box Operational C2 Flow

# 5 3. JFMCC C2 for Planned Kill Box Operations

6 a. Figure C-1 depicts examples of blue and purple kill boxes within the C2 of the JFMCC's area 7 of operation.

8 b. The RCT FSCC passes this request to the MEB staff for approval. The MEB Commander concurs with the kill box request. The FSCC passes this information to the Supporting Arms 9 10 Coordination Center (SACC). The SACC briefs the kill box request to the JFMCC. The JFMCC concurs and establishes the kill box. The SACC further coordinates with the TACC, Air Combat 11 12 Element (ACE). JFMCC Future Operations tasks the Surface Warfare Commander to plan the Naval 13 Surface Fire Support and coordinate with the SACC. The TACC passes the kill box specifics to JFACC Combat Plans in the JAOC. Combat Plans creates missions for the kill box in ATOs AJ 14 15 through AL. ATOS AJ through AL include the following assets for kill box operations: two strike 16 aircraft 4 times per day with an E-2C for tactical command and control. Two Arleigh Burke 17 Destroyers are scheduled to be on station to coincide with the air strikes 4 times per day. Diagram 18 below (See Figure C-4) depicts the MARFOR as the JFMCC and it's C2 flow for a planned kill box.




Figure C-4 JFMCC's Planned Kill Box Operational C2 Flow

# 2 4. JFMCC C2 for Immediate Kill Box Operations

a. Figure C-1 depicts examples of blue and purple kill boxes within the C2 of the JFMCC's area
of operation.

5 b. JFMCC's current operations has the SWC watch officer maintain the P-3 on passes the target onto SODO for weapon-target pairing. CCO establishes and activates the kill box airspace. The 6 7 SODO pairs the submarine with 2 A-10's (11000 rounds 30mm) RTB from a CAS mission, and 8 passes the re-role to the E-3. The E-3, updated with the latest information from the on-station P-3 9 passes the target assignment to a flight of A-10s. The A-10s find the target, obtain PID, ensure 10 friendly deconfliction is accomplished, conduct collateral damage assessment from the cockpit and 11 strafe the submarine. With the A-10's "Winchester", the P-3 coordinates a pass for BHA. 12 c. JFACC's CCO passes the target onto SODO for weapon-target pairing. CCO establishes and

c. JFACC's CCO passes the target onto SODO for weapon-target pairing. CCO establishes and
activates the kill box airspace. The SODO pairs the submarine with 2 A-10's (11000 rounds 30mm)
RTB from a CAS mission, and passes the re-role to the E-3. The E-3, updated with the latest
information from the on-station P-3 passes the target assignment to a flight of A-10s. The A-10s find
the target, obtain PID, ensure friendly deconfliction is accomplished, conduct collateral damage
assessment from the cockpit and strafe the submarine. With the A-10's "Winchester", the P-3
coordinates a pass for BHA. Diagram below (See Figure C-5) depicts the MARFOR as the JFMCC
and it's C2 flow for a immediate kill box.

## FINAL COORDINATION DRAFT




Figure C-5. JFMCC's Immediate Kill Box Operational C2 Flow

# 2 5. JFACC C2 for Planned Kill Box Operations

1

a. Figure C-1 depicts an example of a blue kill boxes employed beyond the forward boundary in
 support of JFACC's operation.

5 b. The MAAP team plans missions to ACM airspaces, points or targets associated with planned kill boxes. Kill box attributes, desired target sets, NSL/RTL restrictions, activation and deactivation 6 7 will be specified in the SPINS or MISSION APMS fields of the ATO. Changes to the air battle plan 8 (ABP) after release of the ATO will be disseminated via ATO/ACO changes (time permitting). Short 9 notice changes during ATO execution are disseminated to air assets through appropriate airspace 10 control agency. The Combat Operations Division of the JAOC acting under the authority of the 11 Airspace Control Authority will coordinate changes and deconfliction with the other component 12 Airspace Control Agencies (JFLCC, JFMCC and joints special operations component commander 13 [JFSOCC]) via kill box coordination C2 systems (C2PC, ADOCS/WEEMC or Chat). Combat 14 Operations will execute the prescribed ATO with the annotated established kill box. Assigned assets 15 will execute the fragged ATO which includes an E-3 AWACS for tactical command and control, a 16 RQ-1 Predator, and multiple flights of 2-ship of strike assets with mixed munitions scheduled to 17 operate SCAR missions in 2-hour vulnerability (VUL) windows in the kill box during the ATO day. 18 Diagram below (See Figure C-6) depicts the the JFACC and it's C2 flow for a planned kill box.




Figure C-6: JFACC's Planned Kill Box Operational C2 Flow

# 2 6. JFACC C2 for Immediate Kill Box Operations

a. Figure C-1 depicts an example of a blue kill boxes employed beyond the forward boundary in
support of JFACC's operation.

b. Within the JAOC, the JFACC's Senior Intelligence Duty Officer (SIDO) confers with the 5 6 SODO to determine that assets are available to send for investigation of the JSTARS tracks. The 7 SODO will request through the CCO that a Blue kill box be established over the area of the JSTARS 8 reported tracks. The CCO will then request approval through the SOLE within the JAOC. JSOTF (or 9 SOLE) will forward kill box approval/restrictions to the theater kill box manager (BCD OPS) for 10 input into display systems (ADOCS, C2PC, etc.) that can kill box establishment and amplifying 11 information. The SODO will relay the kill box establishment to appropriate tactical command and 12 control nodes to include the JSTARS with instructions to assign available assets to investigate the 13 reported tracks. Diagram below (See Figure C-6) depicts the the JFACC and it's C2 flow for a 14 planned kill box.

#### FINAL COORDINATION DRAFT







Figure C-7: JFACC's Immediate Kill Box Operational C2 Flow

# 2 7. JFSOCC C2 for Planned Kill Box Operations

3 The JFSOCC will have a joint fires element (JFE) embedded in the JFSOCC joint operations a. center (JOC), which serves as the focal point for all joint fires issues, including kill box targeting (See 4 5 Figure C-8). The JFSOCC JFE is responsible for kill box coordination and prosecution within its operating areas and controls SOF inputs to the joint force kill box targeting coordination tools. The 6 7 JFSOCC JFE will be the primary node for targeting and deconfliction, but not necessarily the only 8 JFSOCC node. The JFSOCC can potentially employ its forces as one or more subordinate JSOTFs, 9 each with its own JFE. These JSOTFs normally operate within a designated JSOA, possibly within 10 other components' operating areas.

11 b. Subordinate JSOTF JFEs may prosecute identified kill boxes within their JSOAs using organic assets or, when the JSOA is located within another component's operational area, they may 12 13 coordinate directly with that component for any fire support assets allocated or apportioned 14 specifically for kill box operations. Each JSOTF JFE will determine its own FSCM requirements and 15 coordinate those requirements through the JFSOCC JFE. In certain directed situations, where a specific JSOTF may be in support of another component, the JSOTF JFE may coordinate directly 16 17 with the supported component's headquarters for FSCM requirements. The JFSOCC will be kept 18 informed of all applicable coordination.






# 2 8. JFSOCC C2 for Immediate Kill Box Operations

3 a. For kill boxes prosecuted in support of the JFACC, the JSOTF JFE will coordinate with the 4 SOLE representative in the JAOC (See Figure C-9). For kill boxes prosecuted in support of the 5 JFLCC, the JSOTF JFE will coordinate with its deployed SOCCE collocated with the JFLCC JFE or 6 its subordinate corps-level JFE/fires cell. Coordination with the JFMCC will be through the deployed Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU). The JSOTF may permit subordinate units operating 7 8 within another component's operating area, but not within a JSOA, to coordinate directly with the 9 SOCCE or NSWTU for kill box reporting and fires support. The reporting process will follow the 10 procedures established by that component's JFE/fires cell.

For kill boxes prosecuted in support of the JFACC, the JSOTF JFE will coordinate with the 11 b. 12 SOLE representative in the JAOC (See Figure C-9). For kill boxes prosecuted in support of the JFLCC, the JSOTF JFE will coordinate with its deployed SOCCE collocated with the JFLCC JFE or 13 its subordinate corps-level JFE/fires cell. Coordination with the JFMCC will be through the deployed 14 15 NSWTU. The JSOTF may permit subordinate units operating within another component's operating 16 area, but not within a JSOA, to coordinate directly with the SOCCE or NSWTU for kill box reporting 17 and fires support. The reporting process will follow the procedures established by that component's JFE/Fires Cell 18

## FINAL COORDINATION DRAFT



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Figure C-9. JFSOCC C2 and Liaison Integration

1	Appendix D
2	
3	THEATER-SPECIFIC KILL BOX PROCEDURES

#### 4 **1. Background**

Prior to the publication of this multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) manual,
there were (and still are) kill box standard operating procedures (SOPs) in regional combatant
commands. In some cases, there are significant differences between theaters. This MTTP describes
common, generic kill box procedures. The purpose of this appendix is to highlight theater-specific
SOPs or references and their differences.

# **2. Geographic Combatant Command Kill Box Procedures**

11 The following regional combatant commands have kill box SOPs When operating in these 12 theaters, consult these references or organizations for theater-specific kill box procedures.

a. US Central Command (USCENTCOM) – US Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF)
Kill Box Interdiction/Close Air Support CONOPS (KI/CAS CONOPS), 9 Feb 03 (SECRET Rel GBR and AUS).

b. US Pacific Command (USPACOM) – Republic of Korea (ROK) – US Combined Forces
Command Publication 3-1, *Joint Fires – Korea*.

18 c. US European Command (USEUCOM) – (TBD)

19 d. US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) – (TBD)

20 e. US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) – (TBD)

21 US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) – USSOCOM does not have a unique SOP for joint

fires in each theater. USSOCOM will utilize the kill box procedures developed and exercised by the theater COCOM whether it is the supporting or supported commander.

1	Appendix E
2	
3	COMMON GEOGRAPHIC REFERENCE SYSTEM (CGRS)

## 4 1. Overview

5 a. JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, Appendix D, introduces an area reference system. The 6 common geographic reference system (CGRS) is a more detailed explanation of the process involved 7 in creating and using an area reference system, based primarily on USCENTCOM's model used 8 during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

b. CGRS is primarily an operational-level administrative measure used to coordinate
geographical areas rapidly for battlespace deconfliction and synchronization. This reference system
provides a common language between the components and simplifies communications. A CGRS has
proven highly useful in coordinating and facilitating rapid attacks on time sensitive targets (TSTs).
The usefulness of a CGRS is that it enables establishment of appropriate control and coordination
measures that can be mutually coordinated, deconflicted, and synchronized via a simple, common,
mutually understood, and agreed upon reference system.

# 16 **2. CGRS Labeling and Identification**

a. The grid should be labeled with a simple, common, universal identifier recognizable by each
component and their associated C2 and attack assets. Latitude(LAT)/longitude (LONG) references
easily define cells since they are common and exist on most military operational graphics and charts.
LAT/LONG may allow for easy interpretation using digital displays common in the tactical weapon
systems of all components.

22

27

b. The steps in creating a CGRS are straight forward (see Figure A-1):

(1) Designate a grid origin/starting point (base LAT/LONG) for the operating area. The origin
 point should be at the intersection of degree or 30-minute lines of latitude and longitude.

25 (2) Designate a grid end point (upper right corner LAT/LONG) for the operating area. The 26 end point should also be at the intersection of degree or 30-minute lines of latitude and longitude.

- (3) Assign cell dimensions (and subset cell dimensions).
- 28 (4) Assign an alphanumeric labeling system to the grid.

(5) The system used with great success in OIF consists of an alphanumeric grid overlay,
which creates cells of 30 minutes of latitude by 30 minutes of longitude. In far northern or southern
latitudes, consider using 30-minute latitude by 60-minute longitude cells to more closely approximate
the dimensions of a square. Cell nomenclature consists of a number that defines the north-south axis
and a letter that defines the east-west axis. Example: "Cell 7F" (Figure A-1).

c. The approximately 30 x 30 nautical mile (nm) cells can be further subdivided into nine
 keypads identified by using the familiar telephone keypad numbering system (numbered from left to

1 right, top to bottom, 1-9). Example: "Keypad 7F9" (Figure A-1). The keypads are 10 minutes of


2 latitude by 10 minutes of longitude that roughly equates to 10 x 10 nm. In far northern or southern

3 latitudes, consider using a 10-minute latitude by 20-minute longitude keypad to more closely

4 approximate the dimensions of a square. The keypads can be further subdivided into approximately 5

x 5 nm quadrants for special applications, and must be clearly labeled. (Example: 7F9SW, Figure A1).

7 d. The CGRS should have an operational area-defined origin point. A global grid origin point is 8 impractical and undesirable.



**Note**: The CGRS cell labeling system is "read up, then read right" process rather than the military grid reference system's "read right, and then read up." Care must be taken to ensure a referenced cell is correctly identified.

# 11 12

9 10

## Figure E-1. Common Geographic Reference System Example

# 13 **3. CGRS Development**

a. The JFC should develop the CGRS for the entire operational area including over land and
 nearby maritime areas, and mandate use by all components. The CGRS should be developed in
 consultation with all affected commanders and agencies. Guidance from the JFC and inputs from
 other component commanders are critical to ensuring the reference system fits the needs of the joint
 force and, more importantly, is accepted as a mutual tool. Once developed, the JFC should evaluate
 the system for its potential to expedite coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization within the

1 operational area. Once approved, the reference system is passed to each component and their

- 2 associated C2 and attack assets. Instructions for establishing, labeling, and using it should be
- 3 published in appropriate component orders.

b. All agencies must operate on a common map datum to prevent location errors that could
result in fratricide or missed targets. Although recent US-produced maps use the World Geodetic
System's 84-ellipsoid system, older or foreign maps may use a different reference system that must
have a correction factor applied. Most tactical fire support computer systems can automatically apply
the correction if the map datum information is entered during computer set up.

c. Multiple reference systems within an operational area will cause confusion and must be
avoided. Care must be taken to ensure that proper deconfliction is conducted on the fringes where
two separate operational areas meet to ensure overlap does not occur. A JFC may designate specific
cells as inactive (non-applicable) for his operational area grid to aid in deconfliction should an
overlap of CGRSs occur.

d. A CGRS origin point or orientation should not be changed during combat operations unless
 the adverse impact of a compromised grid system outweighs the risk of fratricide caused by potential
 cell confusion. Keeping grid origin locations secret and minimizing/eliminating unsecured
 transmissions of cell targeting locations will aid in keeping a grid system secure. Even if a CGRS is
 suspected to be compromised, disciplined use of secure communications can mitigate any potential
 advantage to an enemy.

# 20 4. CGRS Applications

a. The CGRS cells themselves are not FSCMs, ACMs, or maneuver control measures (MCMs),
 but simply a common reference system that complements joint fire support and/or airspace control
 systems and measures.

b. Control and coordination measure boundaries can be delineated by CGRS cells, keypads, and
quadrants. The CGRS is a two-dimensional construct, but FSCM and ACM areas delineated by
CGRS cells may have altitudes attached to them (such as in a kill box).

c. The CGRS can be a tool for rapid deconfliction during non-contiguous battlefield operations
 (such as special operations forces [SOF] operating behind enemy lines) and may even be employed as
 a primary method to describe a contiguous battlefield.

(1) The CGRS is flexible enough to be used for a variety of purposes, including being used to
 identify littoral maritime warfare areas for antisubmarine warfare and antisurface warfare forces.


32 d. The CGRS is not:

(1) A replacement for the world geographic reference system, or the military grid reference
 system based upon the universal transverse mercator and universal polar stereographic grids.

35

(2) Used to specify grid coordinates for target location or for platform/weapon targeting.

e. If a target is acquired and areas of intended attack are designated, they can be rapidly
correlated to a specific cell location. The identifying component can then establish appropriate
control and coordinating measures, (such as FSCMs and/or ACMs), as authorized, to expedite and
deconflict attacks with other components (such as designating a cell as a kill box, etc.). Some
situations warrant simultaneous joint engagements within a single cell area. FSCMs and/or ACMs
(such as informal airspace coordination areas with altitude separation) constructed appropriately to
allow for rapid coordination and deconfliction of combined arms attacks.



# **5. Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB) Integration**

- 11 The CGRS must be built in the "facilities" portion of the local MIDB as a point target that
- 12 represents a 30 x 30-minute area. As a technique, the lower left corner of a 30 x 30-minute cell could
- 13 identify the cell (Figure A-2). Multiple "O" suffixes could then be built to identify subset cells
- 14 (keypads or quadrants). Once the CGRS is built into the local MIDB, it can be transmitted to other
- 15 components to be used for target development.




Figure E-2. MIDB LAT/LONG Example

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- 11 JP 3-60. Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 January 2002

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13 FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 30 September 1997

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# GLOSSARY

## 2 PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

1

3 Α A2C2 4 Army airspace command and control 5 AADC area air defense commander 6 ACA airspace coordination area; airspace control authority 7 ACE air combat element; analysis and control element; airborne control element 8 ACM airspace control measure 9 ACO airspace control order 10 ADA air defense artillery ADC air defense commander 11 12 ADCON administrative control 13 ADOCS automated deep operations coordination system AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 14 AFDC Air Force Doctrine Center 15 16 AFI Air Force Instruction AFTTP(I) 17 Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Interservice) 18 ALO air liaison officer 19 ALSA Air Land Sea Application 20 AO area of operations 21 AOA Amphibious Objective Area 22 area of responsibility AOR 23 ARFOR Army forces 24 ARSOTF Army special operations task force ASOC 25 air support operations center 26 ATO air tasking order 27 AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System (Boeing E-3A Sentry) В 28 29 BCD battlefield coordination detachment 30 BCL battlefield coordination line

1	BDA	battle damage assessment
2	BHA	bomb hit assessment
3	С	
4	C2	command and control
5	CAS	close air support
6	CCO	Chief of Combat Operations
7	CD	collateral damage
8	CDC	Combat Division Center
9	CDE	collateral damage estimate
10	CFL	coordinated fire line
11	CGRS	common geographic reference system
12	CJSOTF	combined joint special operations task force
13	СО	commanding officer
14	COC	combat operations center
15	СОР	common operational picture
16	CSSE	combat service support element
17	D	
18	DASC	direct air support center
19	DOCC	deep operations coordination cell
20 21	DOTML-PF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities
22	DTG	date time group
23	E	
24	EA	establishing authority
25	F	
26	FAC(A)	forward air controller (airborne)
27	FAIO	field artillery intelligence officer
28	FB	forward boundary
29	FDC	fire direction center
30		
	FEBA	forward edge of the battle area
31	FEBA FFCC	forward edge of the battle area force fires coordination center
31 32		

1	FRAGO	fragmentary order
2	FSCC	fire support coordination center
3	FSCL	fire support coordination line
4	FSCM	fire support coordinating measures
5	FSCOORD	fire support coordinator
6	FSE	fire support element
7	G	
8	G3	operations staff officer
9	GCE	ground combat element
10	н	
11	HPT	high priority target
12	I	
13	IAW	in accordance with
14	IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
15	ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
16	ISRD	ISR Division
17	J	
18	JAOC	joint air operations center
19	JFACC	joint force air component commander
20	JFC	joint force commander
21	JFE	joint fires element
22	JFLCC	joint force land component commander
23	JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
24	JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
25	JOA	joint operations area
26	JOC	joint operations center
27	JSOA	joint special operations area
28	JSOACC	joint special operations air component commander
29	JSOTF	joint special operations task force
30	JSTARS	Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
31	К	
32	KBC	kill box coordinator

1	L	
2	LANTIRN	Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared, Night
3	LNO	liaison officer
4	Μ	
5	MAAP	master air attack plan
6	MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
7	MARDIV	Marine division
8	MARFOR	Marine Corps forces
9	MCCDC	US Marine Corps Combat Development Command
10	MCM	maneuver control measures
11	MCPDS	Marine Corps Publication Distribution System
12	MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
13	MDMP	military decision-making process
14	MEB	Marine expeditionary brigade
15	MEF	Marine expeditionary force
16 17	METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available
18 19	METT-TC	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available, civil considerations
20	MIDB	Modernized Integrated Database
21	MILSTRIP	Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedure
22	MISREP	mission report
23	MOC	Maritime Operating Center
24	MSC	major subordinate command
25	MTTP	multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures
26	MSL	mean sea level
27	Ν	
28	NAVSUP	Navy Supplement Publication
29	NFA	no-fire area
30	NSFS	naval surface fire support
31	NSL	no-strike list
32	NSWTG	naval special warfare task group
33	NSWTU	naval special warfare task unit
34	NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

1	NWDC	Navy Warfare Development Command
2	Ο	
3	ODA	operational detachment-Alpha
4	OEF	<b>Operation ENDURING FREEDOM</b>
5	OIF	Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
6	Р	
7	PID	positive identification
8	R	
9	RCT	Regimental Combat Team
10	RMC	rescue mission coordinator
11	ROE	rules of engagement
12	ROK	Republic of Korea
13	ROZ	restricted operating zone
14	RTB	return(ing) to base
15	RTL	restricted target list
16	S	
17	SACC	supporting arms coordination center
18	SADO	search and rescue duty officer
19	SCAR	strike coordination and reconnaissance
20	SCUD	surface-to-surface missile system
21	SIDO	senior intelligence duty officer
22	SMC	subordinate maritime commander
23	SOCCE	special operations command and control element
24	SODO	senior operations duty officer
25	SOF	special operations forces
26	SOLE	special operations liaison element
27	SOP	standard operating procedure
28	SPINS	special instructions
29	SWC	strike warfare commander
30	Т	
31	TACC	tactical air command center
32	TACP	tactical air control party

1	TAI	targeted area of interest
2	TBMCS	theater battle management core system
3	TET	target effects team
4	ТОТ	time on target
5	TRADOC	US Army Training and Doctrine Command
6	TST	time sensitive target
7	U	
8	UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
9	USCENTAF	US Central Command Air Forces
10	USCENTCOM	US Central Command
11	USEUCOM	US European Command
12	USPACOM	US Pacific Command
13	USSOCOM	US Special Operations Command
14	USSOUTHCOM	US Southern Command
15	V	
16	VUL	vulnerability
17		

## 18 **PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

19 20 21 22	Airspace Coordination Area (ACA) - A three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, established by the appropriate ground commander, in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. The airspace coordination area may be formal or informal. (JP 3-09.3)
23 24 25	Airspace Control Measures (ACM) – Rules, mechanisms, and directions governed by joint doctrine and defined by the airspace control plan which control the use of airspace of specified dimensions. (FM 101-5-1)
26 27 28 29 30	Airspace Control Order (ACO) – An order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details of the approved requests for airspace control measures. It is published either as part of the air tasking order or as a separate document. (Army) - It includes temporary airspace control measures and designates which organization is the controlling authority for each. (JP 1-02)
31 32	Air Defense Artillery (ADA) – Weapons and equipment for actively combating air targets from the ground. (JP 1-02)
33 34 35 36	Air Liaison Officer (ALO) – An officer (aviator/pilot) attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air operation matters. (Army) - The senior Air Force officer at each tactical air control party who provides advice on the capabilities, limitations, and employment of fixed wing aircraft

1 2	and coordinates close air support missions with the fire support element. (JP 1-02)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) – The principal air control agency of the theater air control system responsible for the direction and control of air operations directly supporting the ground combat element. It processes and coordinates requests for immediate air support and coordinates air missions requiring integration with other supporting arms and ground forces. It normally collocates with the Army tactical headquarters senior fire support coordination center within the ground combat element. (JP 1-02)
10 11 12 13 14	Air Tasking Order (ATO) – A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. (JP 1-02)
15 16 17 18 19 20	Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) – A geographical area (delineated for command and control purposes in the order of initiating the amphibious operation) within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force's mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. (JP 3-02)
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) – Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the area air defense commander's headquarters. (JP 1-02)
29 30 31 32 33	Area of Operations (AO) – An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 1-02)
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42	<b>Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)</b> – The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. (JP 1-02)
43 44 45 46 47	<b>Battlespace</b> - The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (JP 1-02)

1		<b>n Detachment (BCD)</b> – An Army liaison provided by the Army component
2	C	or force commander to the air operations center (AOC) and/or to the
3	C	component designated by the joint force commander to plan, coordinate, and
4	C	deconflict air operations. The battlefield coordination detachment processes
5	1	Army requests for air support, monitors and interprets the land battle
6	S	situation for the AOC, and provides the necessary interface for exchange of
7		current intelligence and operational data. (JP 1-02)
8		n Line (BCL) - A battlefield coordination line is a fire support coordinating
9		neasure, established based on METT-T, which facilitates the expeditious
10		attack of surface targets of opportunity between the measure and the FSCL.
11		When established, the primary purpose is to allow MAGTF aviation to attack
12		surface targets without approval of a GCE commander in whose area the
13		argets may be located. To facilitate air-delivered fires and deconflict air and
14		surface fires, an airspace coordination area (ACA) will always overlie the
15		area between the BCL and the FSCL. Ground commanders may strike any
16		argets beyond the BCL and short of the FSCL with artillery and/or rockets
17		without coordination as long as those fires deconflict with the established
18		ACA overhead. This includes targets in an adjacent ground commander's
19		zone that falls within the BCL-FSCL area. The BCL is an exclusive Marine
20		Corps FSCM, similar to an FSCL, which facilitates the expeditious attack of
21		argets with surface indirect fires and aviation fires between this measure and
22	t	he FSCL. (MCWP 3-16)
23	Boundary - A line that d	elineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and
24	-	deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (JP
25		3-0)
26	Close Air Support (CAS	S) - Air action by fixed-and-rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that
27		are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration
28		of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (JP 3-09)
29	Collateral Damage (CD	) – Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that
30		would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time.
31		Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the
32		overall military advantage anticipated from the attack. (JP 1-02) The
33		President, SECDEF, CJCS, JFC, or Commanders may issue directives
34		concerning CD in both how it is estimated and what additional approval, if
35		any, is required based on the level of CD determined by the CDE process.
36		Refer to CJCSM 3160.01, Joint Methodology for Estimating Collateral
37		Damage and Caualties for Conventional Weapons: Precision, Unguided, and
38		<i>Cluster(S)</i> , and the theater CDE Methodology for applicable guidance.)
39	<b>Command and Control</b>	(C2) – The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
40		commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the
41		mission. Command and control functions are performed through an
42		arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and
43		procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating,
44		and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
45		(JP 1-02)
46		(CFL) - The coordinated fire line is a line beyond which conventional,
40 47		direct, and indirect surface fire support means may fire at any time within the
48		boundaries of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination.
.0	ι	sources of the estimation neuropulations without additional coordination.

1 2 3	The purpose of the CFL is to expedite the surface-to-surface attack of targets beyond the CFL without coordination with the ground commander in whose area the targets are located. (JP 3-09)
4	Data - Representation of facts, concepts, or instructions in a formalized manner suitable for
5	communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by automatic
6	means. Any representations, such as characters or analog quantities, to which
7	meaning is or might be assigned. (JP 1-02)
8 9 10 11 12	<b>Date Time Group (DTG)</b> – The date and time, expressed in digits and time zone suffix, at which the message was prepared for transmission. (Expressed as six digits followed by the time zone suffix; first pair of digits denotes the date, second pair the hours, third pair the minutes, followed by a three-letter month abbreviation and two-digit year abbreviation.) (JP 1-02)
13	Direct Air Support Center (DASC) – The principal air control agency of the US Marine air
14	command and control system responsible for the direction and control of air
15	operations directly supporting the ground combat element. It processes and
16	coordinates requests for immediate air support and coordinates air missions
17	requiring integration with ground forces and other supporting arms. It
18	normally collocates with the senior fire support coordination center within
19	the ground combat element and is subordinate to the tactical air command
20	center. (JP 1-02)
21 22	Fire Support Coordinating Measures (FSCM) - A measure employed by land or amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously
23	provide safeguards for friendly forces. (JP 3-09.3)
24	<b>Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)</b> - A fire support coordinating measure that is established
25	and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within
26	their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and
27	affected commanders. Fire support coordination lines facilitate the
28	expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating
29	measure. An FSCL does not divide an area of operations by defining a
30	boundary between close and deep operations or a zone for close air support.
31	The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapons systems
32	using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL
33	must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary
34	reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets beyond the
35	FSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse attacks on, or to
36	the rear of, the line. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-
37	surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or
38	amphibious force commander. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain
39	features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to
40	commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. In exceptional
41	circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the
42	attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase
43	the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources. (JP 3-0)
24	<b>Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)</b> - A fire support coordinating measure that is established
25	and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within
26	their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and
27	affected commanders. Fire support coordination lines facilitate the
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39	features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to
40	commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. In exceptional
41	circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the
42	attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase

1	Forward Air Controlle	<b>r</b> (Airborne) – A specifically trained and qualified aviation officer who
2		exercises control from the air of aircraft engaged in close air support of
3		ground troops. The forward air controller (airborne) is normally an airborne
4		extension of the tactical air control party. (JP 1-02)
5 6 7 8	-	<b>attle Area (FEBA)</b> - The foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combat units are deployed, excluding the areas in which the covering or screening forces are operating, designated to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units. (JP 1-02)
9 10 11 12 13 14		<b>Troops (FLOT)</b> - A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The forward line of own troops (FLOT) normally identifies the forward location of covering and screening forces. The FLOT may be at, beyond, or short of the forward edge of the battle area. An enemy FLOT indicates the forward-most position of hostile forces.
15 16 17 18 19		<b>RAGO</b> ) – An abbreviated form of an operation order (verbal, written or digital) usually issued on a day-to-day basis that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued in sections. It is issued after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order. (JP 1-02)
20	Ground Combat Eleme	ent (GCE) – The core element of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF)
21 22 23 24 25		that is task-organized to conduct ground operations. It is usually constructed around an infantry organization but can vary in size from a small ground unit of any type, to one or more Marine divisions that can be independently maneuvered under the direction of the MAGTF commander. The ground combat element itself is not a formal command. (JP 1-02)
26 27		gement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. (JP 0-2)
28	Intelligence Preparatio	<b>n of the Battlespace (IPB)</b> – An analytical methodology employed to reduce
29 30 31 32 33 34		uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. (JP 1-02)
35 36 37		<b>Center (JAOC)</b> – A jointly staffed facility established for planning, directing, and executing joint air operations in support of the joint force commander's operation or campaign objectives. (JP 1-02)
38 39		uced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. (JP 3-09)
40 41 42		int fires that assist air, land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. (JP 3-0)
43 44 45 46	-	onent Commander (JFACC) – The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for the recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning

1	and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions
2	as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the
3	authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the
4	establishing commander. (JP 3-0)
5	Joint Force Commander (JFC) – A general term applied to a combatant commander subunified
6	commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant
7	command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. (JP
8	0-2)
9	Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) – The commander within a unified
10	command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to
11	the establishing commander for making recommendation on the proper
12	employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land
13	forces and assets; planning and coordinating land operations; or
14	accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force
15	land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish
16	missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 3-0)
17	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) – The commander within a unified
18	command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to
19	the establishing commander for making recommendation on the proper
20	employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking
21	maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating land operations; or
22	accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force
23	maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to
24	accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP
25	3-0)
26	Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) – The commander within a
27	unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force
28	responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendation on
29	the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for
30	tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating land
31	operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.
32	The joint force special operations component commander is given the
33	authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the
34	establishing commander. (JP 3-0)
35	Joint Operations Area (JOA) - An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic
36	combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint
37	force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military
38	operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are
39	particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area
40	or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.
41	(JP 0-2)
42	Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA) – A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a
43	joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force
44	to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special
45	operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint
46	special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution.
47	The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission, friendly and
48	hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the

1	number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed
2	into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate
3	a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a
4	continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. (JP 1-02)
5	Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) – A joint task force composed of special operations
6	units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special
7	operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or
8	other operations. The joint special operations task force may have
9	conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the
10	conduct of specific missions. (JP 1-02)
11 12	<b>Kill Box</b> - A three-dimensional area reference that enables timely, effective coordination and control and facilitates rapid attacks. (JP 3-60)
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Linear and Non-linear Battlefield – "The full dimensional joint campaign is in major respects 'nonlinear.' That is, the dominant effects of air, sea, space, and special operations may be felt more or less independently of the front line of ground troops. The impact of these operations on land battles, interacting with the modern dynamics of land combat itself, helps obtain the required fluidity, breadth, and depth of operations. In the same way, land operations can provide or protect critical bases for air, land, sea, and space operations and enable these operations to be supported and extended throughout the theater" (JP 1)
22 23 24 25	Littoral Area – The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. (JDE)
26	Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) – A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around
27	a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine aircraft group, and a
28	brigade service support group. The Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB),
29	commanded by a general officer, is task-organized to meet the requirements
30	of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint task force, as the lead
31	echelon of the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), or alone. It varies in size
32	and composition, and is larger than a Marine expeditionary unit but smaller
33	than a MEF. The MEB is capable of conducting missions across the full
34	range of military operations. (JP 1-02)
35	Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) – The largest Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and the
36	Marine Corps principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger
37	crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent command
38	element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft
39	wings, and Marine force service support groups. The Marine expeditionary
40	force is capable of missions across the range of military operations, including
41	amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any environment. It
42	can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. (JP 1-02)
43	Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP) – A plan that contains key information that forms the foundation
44	of the joint air tasking order. Sometimes referred to as the air employment
45	plan or joint air tasking order shell. Information that may be found in the plan
46	includes joint force commander guidance, joint force air component
47	commander guidance, support plans, component requests, target update

1 2	requests, availability of cap lists, aircraft allocation, etc	babilities and forces, target information from target (JP 1-02)	
3 4	Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) – Fire provided by Navy surface gun and missile systems in support of a unit or units. (JP 1-02)		
5 6	<b>No-Fire Area (NFA)</b> - An area designated by the a effects are prohibited. (JP		
7 8 9 10		complexes, or installations not planned for capture hese may violate laws of armed conflict or ions with indigenous personnel or governments.	
11 12 13 14 15	are not limited to, such des theater of operations, joint	assing more descriptive terms for geographic areas as are conducted. Operational areas include, but criptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, operations area, amphibious objective area, joint d area of operations. (JP 3-0)	
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	PID may vary from operati commander and subordinat prior to combat operations target identification for eng "reasonable certainty" the circumstance dependent, b certainty. What constitutes detailed in the ROE. Threa	valid target prior to engagement. What constitutes on to operation because the joint force e commanders will establish requirements for PID in order to achieve the required confidence of gagement. PID has been previously defined as a carget is a valid target. This will often be at it does not mean achieving 100% mathematical s PID and how PID may be obtained should be at permitting, theater SPINS should be written to ne KBC/SCAR mission to descend to altitudes that	
28 29 30	<b>Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ)</b> – A volume of specific operational missio originating headquarters. (1)	n. Entry into that zone is authorized only by the	
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38	targets directed by higher a a kill box that have specific exceed specified restriction by the establishing headque specific restrictions placed	targets nominated by elements of the joint force orce commander. This list also includes restricted uthorities. (JP 1-02) There may be targets within e restrictions imposed upon them. Actions that as are prohibited until coordinated and approved arters. The restricted targets, as well as the on those targets and the approval authority to e maintained on the RTL. (JP 1-02)	
39 40 41		by competent military authority that delineate the ons under which US forces will initiate and/or ent with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02)	
42 43 44 45 46	of special operations forces performs command and co	<b>tent (SOCCE)</b> – A special operations command CE) that is the focal point for the synchronization activities with conventional forces operations. It ntrol or liaison functions according to mission ed by the establishing special operations forces	

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	normally collocates with the cor SOCCE can also receive special and target acquisition reports din elements and provide them to th SOCCE remains under the opera	y and responsibility may vary widely. It nmand post of the supported force. The operations forces operational, intelligence, rectly from deployed special operations e supported component headquarters. The ational control of the joint force special ler or commander, joint special operations
9 10 11		Reserve Component forces of the Military etary of Defense and specifically organized, t and support special operations. (JP 1-02)
12 13 14 15 16 17	component commander (if desig command and control organizati	ial operations liaison team provided by the mponent commander to the joint force air mated), or appropriate Service component air ion, to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate nd subsurface operations with conventional
18 19 20 21		ommand relationship, the commander who commander's force or capabilities, and who he supporting commander understands the
22 23 24 25 26	coordination of fire support of the	munication facilities incident to the ne artillery, air, and naval gunfire are unterpart to the fire support coordination
27 28 29 30		ommand relationship, the commander who sustains another commander's force, and who assistance required by the supported
31 32	Synchronization – The arrangement of military actions maximum relative combat powe	in time, space, and purpose to produce r at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0)
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41	directed. It is the senior agency of system that serves as the operation element commander. It provides element commander and his batt execute all current and future ain ground task force. The tactical a	al US Marine Corps air command and control as and air defense warning functions are of the US Marine air command and control onal command post of the aviation combat the facility from which the aviation combat the staff plan, supervise, coordinate, and coperations in support of the Marine air- ir command center can provide integration, int and combined air operations. (JP 1-02)
42 43 44	<b>Tactical Air Control Party</b> ( <b>TACP</b> ) – A subordinate op system designed to provide air li aircraft. (JP 1-02)	perational component of a tactical air control iaison to land forces and for the control of
45 46	<b>Targeted Area of Interest</b> ( <b>TAI</b> ) – The geographical are successful interdiction will cause	ea or point along a mobility corridor where e the enemy to either abandon a particular

1	course of action or require him to use specialized engineer support to
2	continue, where he can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. Not all
3	TAIs will form part of the friendly course of action; only TAIs associated
4	with high-payoff targets are of interest to the staff. These are identified
5	during staff planning and wargaming. TAIs differ from engagement areas in
6	degree. Engagement areas plan for the use of all available weapons; TAIs
7	might be engaged by a single weapon. (FM 100-5-1)
8 9	<b>Terminal Attack Control</b> – The authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft. (JP 3-09)
10	<b>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)</b> – A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator,
11	uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be
12	piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or
13	nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and
14	artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles. (JP 1-02)
15	Winchester – No ordnance remaining. (ALSA MTTP Brevity)

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